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Before the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016, it appeared relatively easy to 
predict the outcome of the high-profile religious liberty case before the Supreme Court that term: 
Zubik v. Burwell, which consolidated seven cases involving thirty-six religious non-profit 
petitioners, including, most notoriously, the Little Sisters of the Poor, various other faith-based 
social services organizations, and a collection of colleges and universities. What was at issue in 
those cases, as in Hobby Lobby two years prior, is the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s so-called 
contraceptive mandate. The ACA stipulated that employers’ health insurance plans offer women 
“preventive care and screenings” without cost-sharing requirements. The ACA also authorized the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to specify what preventive care would be 
covered. HHS subsequently required that employers’ health insurance plans make available all 
contraceptives approved by the Food and Drug Administration. These contraceptives include four 
that allegedly act as abortifacients: two forms of the morning-after pill, Plan B and Ella; and two 
types of intrauterine devices, Mirena and Paragard. (Research indicates, however, that only 
Paragard, which is a copper IUD, may on occasion prevent implantation; normally it works by 
impairing sperm, for which copper is toxic. Plan B and Ella inhibit ovulation, whereas Mirena 
prevents sperm from making it to the egg by changing the composition of the cervical mucus. At 
the same time, it should be noted that, when IUDs fail to prevent pregnancy, miscarriage rates 
double to about forty to fifty percent unless the IUD is removed early in the pregnancy.1) 
What was at issue in Zubik can be put more precisely: whether the “accommodations” 
established by the Obama administration for religious non-profit employers (as opposed to houses 
of worship) satisfied the terms of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), or 
instead violated the petitioners’ religious liberty under RFRA. (Hobby Lobby was different in that 
there the petitioners were closely-held for-profit corporations whose owners had religious 
objections to the contraceptive mandate.) Initially, in order to be exempt from having to provide 
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contraceptive coverage, religious non-profit employers were required to register their opposition 
with their contracting insurance companies or third-party administrators, at which point the 
insurance companies or TPA issued separate contraceptive policies at no cost to the employers. 
Following litigation by the Little Sisters of the Poor, the accommodation took a second form: 
beginning in January 2014, in order to be exempt, religious non-profit employers were allowed to 
notify HHS of their opposition; HHS then had the responsibility to contact the insurance 
companies or TPA. This alternative introduced another step, and so a bit more distance, between 
the employers and the provision of the coverage to which they objected on religious grounds. The 
petitioners in Zubik claimed, however, that the accommodation in this form was likewise 
inadequate. For it nonetheless required that they cooperate in the provision of contraceptives, in 
particular by providing contact information for HHS to work with. 
As readers of the news know, the Supreme Court decided, effectively, not to decide Zubik, in 
any event for now. In a May 16, 2016 per curiam order, the Court vacated “the judgments below” 
and remanded the various cases to the respective Courts of Appeals. “Given the gravity of the 
dispute and the substantial clarification and refinement in the positions of the parties” in 
supplemental briefings submitted after oral argument, “the parties on remand,” the Court declared, 
“should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates 
petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ 
health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage’” (578 U.S. 
[2106], slip op. at 3–4). The Court also acknowledged, however, the possibility of remaining “areas 
of disagreement,” but deemed “the importance of those areas of potential concern […] uncertain, 
as is the necessity of this Court’s involvement at this point to resolve them” (578 U.S. [2106], slip 
op. at 4). Time will tell.2 
This iteration of the forum “Ethics in Focus” concerns the ethics of cooperation as it applies to 
religious liberty cases like Zubik, Hobby Lobby, and no doubt others that will come before the 
Supreme Court. Zubik raised complex legal, political, and moral questions.3 The legal questions, 
to begin with, concern the interpretation of RFRA, which was passed by Congress in response to 
the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith. Before Smith, the Supreme 
Court generally used a balancing test in its First Amendment, free exercise cases. This balancing 
test, called the Sherbert test for the 1963 decision from which it derived, “took into account,” 
Justice Samuel Alito explained in the Hobby Lobby decision, “whether the [government’s action 
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in question] imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was 
needed to serve a compelling government interest” (573 U.S. [2014], slip op. at 4). By contrast, 
Justice Scalia’s 5–4 majority opinion in Smith argued to the “conclusion that generally applicable, 
religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest” (494 U.S. 872, 886 n. 3 [1990]). In his colorful 
language, in view of our society’s diversity of religious belief, “we cannot afford the luxury of 
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct 
that does not protect an interest of the highest order” (494 U.S. 872, 888 [1990]). Three years after 
Smith was decided, Congress made clear its disagreement. RFRA prescribes that “Government 
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability” not directed against this or that religious practice or interest. 
Notwithstanding, lest every citizen become a law unto him or herself—Justice Scalia’s fear if every 
law had to jibe with citizens’ religious practice and interests—Congress also allowed for 
exceptions. Burdens resulting from rules of general applicability are legally permitted when the 
government can demonstrate that the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”4 
A point of dispute in Zubik was whether RFRA simply restores the pre-Smith compelling 
interest test, or departs from and goes beyond the pre-Smith cases through its least-restrictive-
means test. Another legal question was what constitutes a substantial burden of a person’s exercise 
of religion—that is, what are the criteria to make a burden “substantial”?—and further whether it 
is even the business of judges to determine if a burden really is substantial, rather than taking 
petitioners’ sincere word for it. No less contested, legally, is what weight to give employees’ liberty 
interests. Dissenting in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ruth Ginsburg quoted from Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey: “The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation 
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives” (505 U. S. 833, 856 [1992]). 
In her own words, “Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances […] must not 
significantly impinge on the interests of third parties,” whose beliefs may well differ from their 
employers’ (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 7). It is noteworthy in this regard that, according to the 
Pew Research Center, seventy-six percent of Catholics believe that the church should change its 
teaching and permit the use of contraceptives; among Catholics who attend Mass weekly, the 
percentage with this view is sixty-two. Moreover, the Guttmacher Institute reports that sixty-eight 
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percent of sexually active Catholic women have used the pill, IUDs, or sterilization in order to 
avoid pregnancy.5 
These legal questions lead into political questions. Religious liberty is popularly called 
“America’s first freedom,” not merely because it is enshrined in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution, but because it is a fundamental freedom, the recognition of which ensures the 
recognition of further rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and privacy, among 
others.6 By contrast, a government that does not recognize religious liberty is sure to limit other 
freedoms. Arguably, then, protecting religious liberty ought to be a priority of every liberal people. 
Along these lines, the amicus brief filed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in 
Zubik proposes that 
 
[a] government that places […] pressure on religious charitable organizations [as 
the Obama administration allegedly did with the contraceptive mandate] engages 
in a kind of soft tyranny, for it means that they must think and act as the government 
commands on sensitive issues surrounding human life and reproduction, issues on 
which the religious community has a distinctive and prophetic voice.7 
 
It is also arguable, however, that the charge of tyranny can be turned around. Though religious 
liberty is fundamental, when it is wielded to limit what others can do—for example, “control their 
reproductive lives”—prioritizing it may be seen as ceding all too much power to religiously-
motivated objectors. 
Despite authoring the decision in Smith, Justice Scalia joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
in Hobby Lobby, which interprets RFRA as going beyond the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence and 
holds that judges should defer to petitioners’ sincere belief that a governmental action constitutes 
a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. Along similar lines, Justice Alito also wrote that 
“the federal courts have no business addressing […] whether [a] religious belief asserted in a 
RFRA case is reasonable” (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 36). There were two key beliefs in Hobby 
Lobby: first, that “the four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients” (the two forms of the 
morning-after pill and two types of intrauterine devices); second, that complying with HHS 
regulations was connected to the provision of the contraceptives “in a way that is sufficient to 
make it immoral” for the petitioners to do so (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 2, 36). 
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The reason why it appeared relatively easy to predict the outcome of Zubik before Justice 
Scalia’s death is that the petitioners in Zubik believed, first, that the use of contraceptives is 
immoral and, second, that complying with HHS regulations—here, having to notify insurers, 
TPAs, or HHS of their opposition—was connected to the provision of contraceptives “in a way 
that is sufficient to make it immoral” to do so. If “the federal courts have no business addressing 
[…] whether [a] religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable,” Zubik would have been 
decided 5–4 just the same as Hobby Lobby. 
But is it reasonable to believe that complying with HHS regulations—in particular, notifying 
HHS of opposition to coverage of contraceptives—is connected to the provision of contraceptives 
in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral to do so? With Justice Scalia’s death, and 
notwithstanding the Court’s May 16, 2016 order, it appears that what Justice Alito called, in Hobby 
Lobby, “a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy”—namely, the 
question of the right understanding of the ethics of cooperation in wrongdoing—can no longer be 
set aside. In Justice Alito’s terms, this question concerns “the circumstances under which it is 
wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but has the effect of enabling or 
facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another” (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 36). The 
majority decision in Hobby Lobby castigated HHS for “[a]rrogating [to itself] the authority to 
provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question” and declined to 
judge whether the petitioners’ own answer was right or wrong (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 36–
37). Neither the dissenting justices in Hobby Lobby, however, nor all the lower courts in the cases 
leading to Zubik showed this same reluctance. The Court’s May 16, 2016 order hangs, accordingly, 
on the question of whether this point of disagreement between the petitioners and government can 
be resolved. 
 
Here’s background toward understanding the moral question in dispute. 
In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito cites, in a footnote, three discussions of the ethics of cooperation: 
one relatively recent discussion by the philosopher David Oderberg, and two older discussions by 
the Jesuit moralists Thomas J. Higgins and Henry Davis. Justice Alito quotes both Higgins and 
Davis (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 36 n. 34). From Higgins we hear that “‘[t]he general principles 
governing cooperation’ in wrongdoing—i.e., ‘physical activity (or its omission) by which a person 
assists in the evil act of another who is the principal agent’—‘present troublesome difficulties in 
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application.’”8 From Davis we hear that “[c]o-operation occurs when A helps B to accomplish an 
external act by an act that is not sinful, and without approving of what B does.’”9 Justice Alito’s 
quotation from Davis’s text is in fact somewhat misleading. In the quotation in question, Davis is 
specifying so-called material cooperation as opposed to formal cooperation. In the sentence 
preceding what Justice Alito quotes, Davis writes, “Co-operation is formal when A helps B in an 
external sinful act, and intends the sinfulness of it.”10 In any event, Davis agrees with Higgins that, 
in Higgins’ words quoted in part by Justice Alito, “The general principles governing co-operation 
[…] present troublesome difficulties in application.”11 Davis makes an even stronger claim in this 
regard: in view of how “many factors enter into all questions of material co-operation […], there 
is no more difficult question than this in the whole range of Moral Theology.”12 
In context, Justice Alito’s quotation of Higgins supports the point that neither judges, nor all 
the more HHS administrators have any business mucking around with the ethics of cooperation. 
For surely they lack the competence to go where theologians fear to tread! Justice Alito goes on to 
quote from Smith that “courts must not determine […] the plausibility of a religious claim” (573 
U. S. [2014], slip op. at 37; see 494 U. S. 872, 887 [1990]). It might be wondered, however, just 
where the “religious claim” is here. The right understanding of the ethics of cooperation is indeed 
pertinent for moral theology, but in pursuing it moral theologians turn philosophical, which is to 
say, for present purposes, take up questions that human wisdom is charged with figuring out and 
to which divine revelation has not spoken. It’s true that much of the terminology used in discussing 
the ethics of cooperation is derived from the Roman Catholic tradition, but the distinction between 
formal and material cooperation, for example, has its roots not only in the work of the eighteenth-
century moral theologian Alphonsus Liguori, but in that of the thirteenth-century philosopher and 
theologian Thomas Aquinas, and many centuries before him in that of the thinker Aquinas called 
simply the Philosopher, namely, Aristotle. 
Here is how the philosopher David Oderberg, cited but not quoted by Justice Alito, 
distinguishes between formal and material cooperation:  
 
The formal co-operator intends the wrong committed by the principal […]. Material 
co-operation does not involve such an intent.13 
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What informs the cooperator’s will in facilitating the principal’s action—in a word, the 
cooperator’s intention in acting—is the crucial consideration. Likewise, the amicus brief submitted 
by “50 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists in Support of Petitioners” states: 
 
“Formal” cooperation in wrongdoing occurs when one commits an action that 
contributes to or assists another’s wrongful act, in such a way that the cooperator 
shares in the wrongful intention of the other actor.14 
 
By contrast, the brief goes on: 
 
Material cooperation occurs when the cooperator facilitates or assists in the 
performance of the forbidden action without sharing in the wrongful intention.15 
 
What constitutes, however, “sharing in the wrongful intention”? The literature on cooperation in 
wrongdoing is full of colorful, sometimes fanciful cases. Say that you are being held at gunpoint. 
The aggressor wants to know from you the details of your business partner’s bank account so that 
he can steal from it.16 If you tell the would-be thief the details (which it is stipulated you know), 
would your cooperation in wrongdoing be “formal” or “material”? That is, would you share in the 
wrongful intention or not? 
This question is sometimes answered by another question in turn: Do you approve of the action 
in which you’re cooperating? If not, it is suggested that your cooperation is material and not formal. 
So Oderberg writes: “Formal co-operation involves approval of the wrong and willing 
participation in its guilt.”17 And according to another author: “Whereas formal cooperation 
involves intended approval of [the principal’s] action, material cooperation is first and foremost 
helping [the principal] to accomplish an external action […] without approving of the external 
action.”18 
But now it has to be asked what “approving” amounts to. To begin with, as Oderberg observes 
in his contribution to this forum, “one can approve of a wrongful act without thinking that it is 
wrong. One might think it’s just fine to rape someone, as an act of revenge, say, and so approve it, 
even though one does not see it as a heinous act.”19 But is approval a distinct mental act or 
disposition of an agent known only to him or her? Further, is an agent’s claim to approve or 
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disapprove of an action in which she has cooperated incorrigible, in the way that a sincere claim 
to have dreamt this or that, or to have felt sleepy, or anxious, or angry isn’t open to rebuttal, so 
long as the agent knows the meaning of the concepts she’s invoked? Otherwise put, can an agent 
say of any and every action in which she has cooperated that she did not approve of it? Do all such 
actions admit of this disclaimer? 
The drift of these questions is clearly toward no. As the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe 
remarked, “Circumstances, and the immediate facts about the means you are choosing to your 
ends, dictate what descriptions of your intention you must admit.”20 Or again, “A man’s intention 
in acting is not so private and interior a thing that he has absolute authority in saying what it is—
as he has absolute authority in saying what he dreamt.”21 To claim otherwise is practically to invite 
the ridicule that Blaise Pascal, in the seventh of his Provincial Letters, heaped on his fictional 
Jesuit’s grande méthode de diriger l’intention permitting one to do otherwise prohibited actions 
on the condition that one is able to find for these same actions a licit “object.”22 
Oderberg, well aware of this point, acknowledges it with the statement that “intent to assist may 
be implied by the circumstances”: it may be, that is, implicit or explicit.23 More fully, an action 
may count as formal cooperation when the claim of not having intended some particular end just 
can’t be admitted in view of the fact that one’s action was directly ordered to that end.24 An 
example in the literature is willingly participating in the sacred rites of a pagan cult. Saying, after 
the fact, that you did not intend to cooperate in the worship of Dionysus or Mithras makes no 
sense; your willing participation does not admit of any other intention, even if you didn’t “approve” 
of the rites. 
The distinction between formal and material cooperation is not, however, quite so simple as 
that example might suggest. What if your participation was not fully “willing”? What if you 
participated under duress, maybe even severe duress? Recall here our case involving the details of 
your business partner’s bank account. Let it be stipulated that you do not approve of the theft. 
(Oderberg writes: “presumably your will is directed against that of the thief.”25) Nonetheless, it 
might be claimed that you do intend to facilitate the theft of your partner’s money. Yes, what’s 
driving your action is that you intend to save your own life, but can it be denied that you intend to 
facilitate the theft as a means toward saving your life? Can it be denied, that is, that you “share in 
the wrongful intention”? 
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In brief, it might be argued, though controversially, that your cooperation here is formal. You 
intend to facilitate what the principal intends (namely, stealing from your partner) under the 
description, “doing what he intends for me to do.” More fully, you intend “doing what he intends 
for me to do so that he can do what he intends.”26 Yet it boggles the mind that it would be morally 
impermissible for you to cooperate.27 In other words, such a conclusion would clearly be wrong—
who but a philosopher in the grip of an argument would claim you should die rather than reveal 
the bank account details?—with the upshot either that it must not be the case that all formal 
cooperation in wrongdoing is wrong, or that this instance of formal cooperation should not be 
categorized as formal cooperation in wrongdoing, or that what we have here is not formal 
cooperation after all (as Oderberg contends). One way or the other, it appears that formal 
cooperation is wrong only when two conditions are met: you intend not only “doing what he 
intends for me to do so that he can do what he intends” (necessary condition #1), but you share the 
principal’s intention that the intended wrong come to pass (necessary condition #2 and, with the 
first condition, jointly sufficient). In other words, perhaps more precisely, it is your intention that 
an evil be done with your help. You lend your hand, so to speak, to this intention; in theological 
language, you intend the sinfulness of the action in question, not simply the action under an 
arbitrary description, but under the description whereby it is wrong.28 Against this background, it 
is understandable why the question of “approval” entered the literature on cooperation. 
If you don’t intend that an evil be done with your help, as presumably you wouldn’t in the case 
involving your partner’s banking account, it might be claimed that you cooperated formally in the 
thief’s action, but your cooperation in wrongdoing or in evil was merely material. For what you 
did was but matter—but building blocks, we might say—toward the evil that came to pass. You 
intended, it might be claimed, “doing what he intends for me to do so that he can do what he 
intends,” but you didn’t share the principal’s evil intention that evil be done. That evil be done 
didn’t inform your will—it was contrary to your will—and thus cannot be ascribed to you as your 
intention.29 
There is much still to say about material cooperation, which may be morally permissible or not 
depending on whether it is immediate or mediate (that is, depending on how “near” the 
cooperator’s action is to that of the principal: “the degree to which the physical extension of the 
action of the cooperator overlaps with the wrongful action of the principal”30); proximate or remote 
(depending on whether the cooperator’s action “provides a probable instrument of wrongful 
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use”31); and indispensable or dispensable, among other considerations. It should be stressed, 
however, that these are precisely considerations, not make-or-break factors in a decision calculus. 
For example, the more indispensable, or necessary, the cooperator’s action is toward the wrong in 
question, the graver the consequences of not cooperating must be in order to permit the 
cooperation. But here practical wisdom—prudentia or phronesis—can’t be dispensed with; it is 
needed to come to terms with the particularities of the case. To illustrate this point further, the 
graver the consequences of cooperating are—toward others as well as the agent him or herself—
the greater the reason must be in order to permit it, with the implication that in some cases that 
reason will not be great enough. Again practical wisdom is indispensable. By way of example, say 
that a gun-wielding aggressor wants, not the details of your partner’s bank account, but the launch 
codes for your country’s nuclear weapons. Cooperation in the evil would be material, but, as the 
practically wise person would quickly see, morally impermissible for more reasons than one. 
How does all this bear, finally, on cases like Zubik v. Burwell? Would compliance with the 
administration’s “accommodations” constitute impermissible formal or material cooperation, as 
fifty Catholic theologians and ethicists claimed in an amicus brief submitted in support of the 
petitioners?32 Should judges—can judges?—avoid taking a stand on this question? Is the judgment 
that cooperation would be impermissible a “religious claim” warranting deference? Or is the 
appeal to religious liberty here misguided, in particular in a constitutional democracy like the 
United States, characterized by pervasive pluralism?33 The contributors to this iteration of “Ethics 
in Focus” speak richly to these questions and multiple others. Charles F. Capps is pursuing a J.D. 
and a Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Chicago; T.A. Cavanaugh is Professor of Philosophy 
at the University of San Francisco; David S. Oderberg is Professor of Philosophy at the University 
of Reading (U.K.); and Kate Ward is Visiting Assistant Professor of Theology at Marquette 
University. 
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